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I. Introduction  
 
There are many different explanations as to what radicalisation is and how and why people 
radicalise. At its core, radicalisation is a process in which a person adopts extremist views and 
moves towards committing a violent act. Models describing the process of radicalisation 
differ on how many steps or stages are involved in the progression towards violence (Gill, 
2007; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2007, 2004; Taarnby, 
2005). Common metaphors describe it as a ‘staircase’ (Moghaddam, 2005) or ‘pathway’ (Gill, 
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Abstract 
This article assesses whether the scholarly literature on radicalisation is 
adequately integrated into national policy strategies for countering violent 
extremism (CVE). It outlines concepts and models of radicalisation, and offers a 
framework for understanding its various complex causes. The article then 
compares this scholarly research against case studies of CVE policy from the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands. These 
countries’ policies adequately capture the core nature of radicalisation, but 
otherwise exhibit significant variation in how they explain its causes. This can be 
explained partly by a lack of clarity over how and why radicalisation happens. 
However, it also suggests that CVE policy is often shaped less by evidence-based 
research, and more by cultural, political and historical factors. This confirms a 
need for evidence-based approaches to CVE, and for deeper comparative studies 
of how radicalisation is understood across national contexts. 
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2007) to terrorism, though scholars are increasingly moving away from linear models (Jensen, 
Atwell Seate, & James, 2018; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). 
The causes of radicalisation are typically explained through a variety of perspectives 
that emphasise psychological, economic and other factors (Christmann, 2012; Hafez and 
Mullins, 2015; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015; Senzai, 2015). A growing number of empirical studies 
test the relevance of these factors by drawing on strain theory, social movement theory and 
other frameworks (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, 2008a; LaFree, Jensen, James & Safer-
Lichtenstein, 2018; Nivette, Eisner & Ribeaud, 2017; Pederson, Vestel, & Bakken, 2018). 
Radicalisation remains a complex field, with no single profile for identifying who is likely to 
radicalise, or when they will progress to committing a violent act (Borum, 2015; Desmarais et 
al., 2017; Horgan, 2008, 2014; Silke, 1998). 
 The complexity of these reasons makes it difficult for governments to design 
appropriate policy responses to terrorism. Strategies for countering violent extremism (CVE) 
have become a core component of national counter-terrorism policy. These national policy 
documents shape CVE programs on the ground, which involve police working with 
communities, health services, government agencies and private companies (Beutel & 
Weinberger, 2016) to address the risks of extremism and radicalisation. CVE programs 
include efforts to address radicalisation directly through prison deradicalisation programs and 
multi-agency interventions for youth at risk of radicalisation. Many CVE programs also 
include primary prevention efforts directed at a wider population (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & 
Zammit, 2016). 
This article begins by assessing the current state of the literature on radicalisation. 
Radicalisation research is constantly developing, so it is useful to periodically take stock of 
the field. Part Two analyses different concepts and models of radicalisation, including its 
relationship to extremism. Part Three offers a framework for understanding the complex 
causes involved in this process. These causes are grouped into ideological, psychological, 
social, political, economic and technological factors. Part Three assesses briefly the weight of 
the available evidence as to how important these factors are in causing radicalisation. 
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Part Four explains the data sources and methods, and Part Five assesses the extent to 
which the scholarly research is integrated in Western CVE policy strategies. Part Five draws 
on case studies from the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Denmark, Sweden and The 
Netherlands. It is based in a qualitative content analysis of national CVE and counter-
terrorism policy documents.  
The main contribution of this article is to marry radicalisation research with an 
analysis of CVE policy. It offers a framework for understanding the causes of radicalisation 
which can be used to assess which explanation governments favour in their respective CVE 
policies. This contributes to deeper comparative analysis of national approaches to CVE. 
The article also aims to contribute to greater consistency in how governments 
understand radicalisation, and a greater reliance on evidence-based approaches. While people 
radicalise for complex and diverse reasons, there should not be any significant inconsistencies 
in how governments understand and model that process. Western governments should also 
maintain compatible explanations of radicalisation so that they can cooperate effectively when 
countering that threat across national borders. 
The following analysis demonstrates that CVE policies adequately capture the core 
nature of radicalisation, but otherwise exhibit significant variation in how they explain its 
causes. This is partly due to ongoing uncertainty over what radicalisation is and how it should 
be modelled. However, it also suggests that CVE policy is often shaped less by evidence-
based research, and more so by political, cultural and historical factors that are specific to 
each national government. This suggests a need for greater consistency across Western 
approaches to CVE, and for deeper comparative studies of how radicalisation is understood 
across national contexts. 
 
II. What is Radicalisation? 
 
Similar to never-ending debates about what constitutes terrorism (Blackbourn, Davis & 
Taylor, 2013; Hardy & Williams, 2011), there is no single agreed definition of radicalisation. 
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In a general sense, radicalisation is a process by which an individual moves towards 
committing a violent act based on extremist views. At the ‘most basic level, according to 
Neumann (2013: 874), ‘radicalization can be defined as the process whereby people become 
extremist’. 
 But what constitutes an ‘extremist’ view? Is it any idea or opinion that is contrary to a 
society’s core values, or does it need to be based in a coherent and recognised ideology? Does 
it need to justify or encourage the use of violence? Does it need to be religious or political? 
The answers to these questions are unclear but important: by declaring that someone has 
radicalised, or is at risk of radicalisation, we are implying that they are progressing on a 
pathway towards terrorism. This triggers more state responses and comes with many more 
connotations than saying that a person has progressed towards criminal conduct of another 
kind. We are also implying that the person has moved beyond a form of legitimate speech or 
political protest (even violent protest) to something morally unjustifiable.  
To warrant state intervention, extremist views should justify, encourage or at the very 
least condone the use of violence to achieve some significant political or religious change. 
Ideas and opinions that are contrary to a society’s core values but create no risk of harm 
should be supported as part of a healthy, functioning democracy that values freedom of 
expression. This might seem an obvious dividing line, but the relationship between 
extremism, violence and free speech remains uncertain. As explained further below, the UK’s 
Prevent strategy continues to target non-violent ideas (Home Office, 2009, 2011; Lowe, 
2017). 
Some of this confusion stems from using the words ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ to describe 
ideas and systems that are not in any way related to terrorism (Neumann, 2013). One can 
propose radical reforms to tax policy, for example, or take an ‘extreme’ approach to dieting 
and exercise. Other ideas – like women’s suffrage – were considered ‘radical’ in a particular 
historical context, but ended up overcoming discrimination and achieving greater equality.  
An important distinction is often drawn between ‘cognitive’ radicalisation, which 
focuses on extremist beliefs, and ‘behavioural’ radicalisation, which focuses on extremist 
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behaviour (Neumann, 2013). This gets at the question: has somebody radicalised once they 
adopt and internalise extremist views, or only if they engage in some criminal conduct (such 
as training for terrorism) as a result? From a public policy perspective, extremist behaviour 
would appear to be the primary concern, but the development of extremist views is also 
clearly relevant. In most Western countries there are criminal offences targeting extremist 
behaviour, including preparatory and ancillary conduct like recruitment for terrorist 
organisations and collecting terrorist documents (McDonald & Carlile, 2014; Tulich, 2012). 
The important question for CVE policy, on the other hand, is how best to deal with people 
who are at risk of engaging in such behaviour – particularly young people who are not yet of 
the age of criminal responsibility. CVE programs also address the risks of radicalisation in a 
wider population through primary prevention measures (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammitt, 
2016). 
 There is little agreement, then, on how extremism and radicalisation should be 
defined, whether these are necessarily linked to terrorist behaviour, and at what point in the 
process it is appropriate for governments to intervene. One thing that scholars typically agree 
on is that radicalisation is a process, either more or less gradual. This process has been 
modelled in different ways. The ‘end-point’ of this process differs depending on whether the 
model favours a cognitive or behavioural approach (Neumann, 2013: 874). The number and 
type of steps involved also varies across different models. However, scholars typically agree 
that there are recognisable stages, and that a person ‘does not become radical overnight’ 
(Christmann, 2012: 10). 
The well-known ‘NYPD Model’ involves four stages: pre-radicalisation, self-
identification through an early exploration of Salafi Islamism, indoctrination through the 
adoption of Jihadi-Salafi ideology, and jihadisation by accepting the duty to participate in 
militant action (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Sageman (2004, 2007) also describes four stages: a 
sense of moral outrage, developing a specific worldview, resonating that worldview with 
personal experiences, and mobilising through interactive networks. Gill’s (2007) ‘pathway’ 
model also has four: exposure to propaganda, the experience of a ‘catalyst’ event, pre-existing 
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social ties which facilitate recruitment, and in-group radicalisation. Mogghadam’s (2005) 
Staircase model describes six steps, beginning on the ‘ground floor’ with psychological 
interpretation of injustice, then ascending through greater moral engagement and categorical 
thinking towards an ultimate violent act. 
Other models set out eight or more steps (Taarnby, 2005), or do away with a linear, 
graduated approach altogether (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Koehler, 2017; McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2008). Increasingly, scholars are moving away from a linear approach towards 
behavioural, relational and multi-causal models (Della Porta, 2018; Jensen, Atwell Seate, & 
James, 2018; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). Others usefully 
condense the various frameworks into a single conceptual model. Koehler (2017), for 
example, offers a theory of ‘de-pluralisation’. He describes violent radical ideologies as those 
which involve some ‘praised future vision’ (Koehler, 2017: 75). The gradual adoption of a 
violent radical ideology leads to the person’s worldview being ‘gradually rewritten, 
restructured and redefined’ (Koehler, 2017: 75). Through this process, the person’s 
‘understanding of core political concepts and values has dramatically changed’ (Koehler, 
2017: 75). Violence may then become the only option to resolve the resulting psychological 
tension.  
Hafez and Mullins (2015) also neatly capture the core nature of radicalisation. They 
define it as ‘(1) a gradual “process” that entails socialization into an (2) extremist belief 
system that sets the stage for (3) violence even if it does not make it inevitable’ (Hafez & 
Mullins, 2015: 960). Radicalisation ‘involves adopting an extremist worldview, one that is 
rejected by mainstream society and one that deems legitimate the use of violence as a method 
to effect societal or political change’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 960). 
The complexity and divergence in these accounts suggests there is little likelihood of 
scholars reaching a consensus over how radicalisation should be modelled. However, there is 
some common ground. Each model describes a person who internalises and strengthens their 
association with an extremist ideology. This internal process is influenced heavily by external 
connections to terrorist groups and networks. This is not necessarily a linear process, but 
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graduated models help us understand an individual’s progression towards violence. As this 
process culminates, the individual may commit a violent act. 
 
III. Causes of Radicalisation 
 
The models above describe the how of radicalisation, but not the why. The reasons why an 
individual radicalises remain diverse and complex (Campelo et al., 2018; Desmarais et al. 
2017; Sieckelinck & Gielen, 2018). Despite significant scholarly efforts, they cannot be 
reduced to a single psychological profile to identify who is at risk of radicalisation (Horgan, 
2008, 2014; Silke, 1998). Below, these various reasons are grouped into a framework 
describing ideological, psychological, social, political, economic and technological factors. 
These factors are not competing alternatives; rather, they are each part of the ‘radicalisation 
puzzle’ (Hafez and Mullins, 2015).  
These are also not pure types. There is overlap, for example, between political 
grievances, ideology and psychological factors. Political grievances can be a core tenet of an 
extremist ideology, and an individual may feel anger or frustration over these, leading them to 
violent action (McCauley & Maskalenko, 2008). However, the categories set out below are 
useful for understanding the dominant causes of radicalisation, and for later assessing how 
governments explain radicalisation through their national CVE policies. 
Technology is more commonly considered an ‘enabler’ than a cause of radicalisation 
(Christmann, 2012; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). However, Islamic State 
has been highly successful in using social media to recruit new members and encourage lone-
wolf attacks around the world (Bertram, 2016; Greenberg, 2016; Klausen, 2015; McDowell-
Smith, Speckhard, & Yayla, 2017). Given these recent developments, it is increasingly 
appropriate to consider the influence of technology on its own terms. The impact of 
technology remains unclear (Conway, 2017; Koehler, 2014), but this might now be 
considered one of the many reasons why people radicalise, and not merely as a medium which 
facilitates radicalisation. 
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a. Ideological 
It might seem obvious, even ‘tautological’ (Guhl, 2018: 192) to say that terrorism is 
based on an extremist ideology. Cognitive radicalisation depends upon the idea that a person 
internalises extremist ideas on their path towards violent action.  
Clearly, many terrorist organisations encourage violent attacks based on a 
fundamentalist and erroneous interpretation of Islam. This comprises more specific ideas, 
including that ‘Western societies are morally bankrupt’, that ‘the West is engaged in a war 
against Muslims’, and that ‘jihad and martyrdom are indeed legitimate means by which 
Muslims defend their faith’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 967). Together these ideas constitute an 
ideology because they describe a ‘master narrative about the world and one’s place in it’ 
(Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 961). Ideologies typically ‘demonize enemies and justify violence 
against them, and they incentivize sacrifice by promising heroic redemption’ (Hafez & 
Mullins, 2015: 961). For Neumann (2013: 880), terrorism cannot be explained without 
reference to these ideological assumptions, because otherwise ‘none of the behaviours make 
any sense’. Hoffman (2006: 82) believes that the ‘religious imperative for terrorism is the 
most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today’. 
Despite the seemingly obvious connection between ideology and terrorism, the causal 
link remains unclear (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Christmann, 2012; Guhl, 2018; Hafez & 
Mullins, 2015; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018). There are two main angles to this argument. The 
first is that group dynamics are considered to have a greater impact than ideology (Guhl, 
2018; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). The importance of groups and networks is addressed further 
below. However, even if further studies continue to confirm this, it does not discount the 
important role that ideology can play in allowing group leaders to influence younger recruits.   
A second argument is that there is no necessary connection between religion and 
terrorism because terrorist organisations rely on a distorted interpretation of Islam. 
Radicalisation is difficult and problematic to explain through an ideological lens because only 
a small percentage of Muslims become violent extremists (Abbas, 2007; Githens-Mazer, 
2008). This is certainly true, but the argument is only partly convincing: the ideology in 
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question is not Islam (as a religion), but rather the fundamentalist version of it relied upon by 
terrorist groups. 
There are more convincing reasons to believe that the link between ideology and 
terrorism is uncertain. First, many individuals who internalise a radical ideology do not 
progress to committing a violent act (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018). 
Second, many terrorists are not devoutly religious; indeed, many have had only minimal 
exposure to extremist ideology before committing acts of violence (Cottee, 2017; Guhl, 
2018). For example, two British men jailed for travelling to Syria purchased copies of Islam 
for Dummies and The Qur’an for Dummies before leaving to fight with Islamic State (Cottee, 
2017). Finally, there are significant historical and geo-political reasons why al-Qaeda, Islamic 
State and other terrorist groups have called for attacks against Western interests. Key among 
these is the involvement of the United States and its Allies in the Middle East (Christmann, 
2012; English, 2016; Hoffman, 2006). This suggests that ideology is an important factor in 
facilitating recruitment, but not the major cause of terrorism. The connection between 
ideology and terrorism remains ‘easy to see but difficult to explain’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 
967). 
 
b. Psychological 
There is no recognised pathology, medical condition or single psychological profile 
that explains why some people become terrorists (Horgan, 2008, 2014; Silke, 1998). 
However, psychological factors still contribute to radicalisation. The strongest among these 
are a lack of self-esteem and sense of identity, which result in the need to join a cause and feel 
valued by others. These needs have been described as a ‘quest for significance’ (Kruglanski et 
al., 2014) and a ‘search for identity contributing to a sense of belonging, worth and purpose’ 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b: 7). According to Silverman (2017), travelling to Syria to fight with 
Islamic State became a ‘coming of age’ story in which many young men aimed to achieve 
personal fulfilment.  
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This search for identity is not sufficient in itself to explain terrorist behaviour: clearly 
the vast majority of young people who lack self-esteem do not become terrorists. However, it 
is consistently recognised as one of the most important factors, alongside group dynamics, 
which has allowed Islamic State and other terrorist groups to be so successful in recruiting 
young members from across the globe (Borum & Fein, 2017; Chassman, 2016; Christmann, 
2012; Dawson & Amarasingam, 2017; Lindekilde, Bertelsen, & Stohl, 2016; Senzai, 2015). 
 
c. Social 
Another consistent finding is that social relationships are crucial to understanding 
radicalisation (Christmann, 2012; Della Porta, 2018; Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Maskaliūnaite, 
2015; McCauley & Maskalenko, 2008; Stern, 2016). This is relevant not only to Islamist 
terrorism, but also left-wing and right-wing terrorism, cult membership, and gangs (Hafez & 
Mullins, 2015). Radicalisation is a ‘group phenomenon’ in which friends, relatives and top-
down recruitment processes encourage new members to internalise a group’s common 
mindset (Christmann, 2012: 27). The influence exerted on new members can range from 
persuasion to manipulation and coercion (McCauley & Maskalenko, 2008; Maskaliūnaite, 
2015). A number of processes facilitate this, including ‘group bonding, group polarisation and 
isolation, and peer pressure’ (Christmann, 2012: 27). 
 There are two main reasons why group dynamics have a significant influence on 
radicalisation. The first is that groups satisfy (and are able to exploit) the psychological need, 
particularly of young recruits, to find a sense of meaning and purpose. Membership of a group 
and participation in its activities satisfies the psychological ‘quest for significance’ 
(Kruglanski et al., 2014). The second reason is that groups amplify the costs of leaving once 
an individual has joined. Even if an individual loses faith in the group’s ideology, strategic or 
tactics, they cannot easily exit. There will be feelings of loyalty, guilt, and anxiety about 
returning to a previous ‘normal’ life (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). There may also be fear of 
criminal sanction by the state or punishment by the group itself. In other words, the 
  
 
 
 
 
Keiran Hardy: Comparing Theories of Radicalisation with Countering Violent Extremism 
Policy 
 
 
 
 
86 
‘emotional, psychological, material, and physical costs of exit can be prohibitively high to 
those seeking to walk away from extremists’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 965). 
 
d. Political 
 There is ongoing disagreement over the influence that political grievances have on 
radicalisation. Key among these grievances is a sense of injustice over Western involvement 
in the Middle East – particularly the invasion of Iraq. Hafez and Mullins (2015: 962) ‘do not 
find compelling any argument’ that these kinds of grievances play a causal role in behavioral 
radicalization. Maskaliūnaite (2015: 19), on the other hand, argues that ‘perceived injustice’ is 
one of the ‘strongest motivators’ to join a violent group. Other reports and survey data 
confirm that grievances are ‘key explanatory factors driving radicalisation’, especially those 
concerning Western foreign policy (Christmann, 2012: 26). 
 Political grievances are insufficient to explain why some people join extremist groups 
and not others. However, their importance should not be understated. To begin with, political 
grievances cannot be neatly separated from ideological concerns about the West being 
‘morally bankrupt’ and ‘at war with Islam’ (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). Terrorist groups 
routinely use political and geo-political reasons as part of the ideology justifying their actions. 
This dates back well before 9/11. A major grievance underlying bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa was 
the close military relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US (English, 2016; Hoffman, 
2006). This led to attacks, prior to 9/11, against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and 
the USS Cole in Aden. Each of these attacks was designed to make the United States 
withdraw its troops from the Middle East. When that did not happen, the US homeland 
became al-Qaeda’s target.  
Even Islamic State (IS), which maintains a more apocalyptic version of Salafi 
Jihadism than al-Qaeda, has significant geo-political reasons for its actions. After coming 
declaring its Caliphate, IS dismantled the physical boundary separating Iraq and Syria. That 
boundary was imposed by the French and British governments under the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement that followed World War One (Sengupta, 2015). It is unlikely that these geo-
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political grievances play a significant role in causing a young individual halfway across the 
globe to commit an act of terrorism. However, political grievances provide an important 
backdrop under which terrorist organisations are able to recruit more members and encourage 
further attacks. 
 
e. Economic 
Many recent terrorist attacks have been committed by well-educated, middle class 
offenders (Porter & Kebbell, 2011; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Smith & Nolan, 2016). There is 
therefore no necessary connection between low socio-economic status and a risk of terrorism. 
Empirical studies have also rejected the suggestion that countries which experience higher 
levels of poverty experience higher levels of terrorism (Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2011).  
However, socio-economic disadvantage can play a causal role in radicalisation by 
aggravating perceptions of injustice. This is captured in the theory of ‘relative deprivation’, 
meaning that a person is aware that others have better material conditions or higher social 
status in comparison to them, and the person perceives these differences to be unjust 
(Christmann, 2012). Relative deprivation can operate on an individual, group or international 
level (Christmann, 2012). 
 Economic disparity is therefore also relevant, and may facilitate radicalisation if 
combined with personal experience of discrimination. According to Hafez and Mullins (2015: 
962), many Muslim communities in Europe experience isolation and discrimination, and this 
can contribute to higher levels of criminality: 
 
At the risk of overly generalizing, one can point to several developments that have 
contributed to Muslim disenchantment with their European host societies. These 
include poor socioeconomic status due to unemployment rates that are consistently 
higher than the national averages. Although the Muslim population of Europe contains 
many educated middle class professionals and wealthy individuals, this is not the case 
for the majority of the population that occupies the lower end of the socioeconomic 
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scale. Unemployment combines with residential discrimination and segregation to 
produce ethnically homogenous neighborhoods that are mostly dilapidated. High 
levels of residential concentration and poor housing conditions contribute to higher 
levels of criminality. Unemployment, poverty, and crime, in turn, produce the usual 
stereotypes concerning the “uncivilized” foreigners. 
Other studies confirm a link between minority discrimination and extremism. One study of 
over 2,500 Muslims residing in Europe and the US found that perceived discrimination 
towards Muslims was significantly associated with the belief that suicide bombing is justified 
(Victoroff, Adelman, & Matthews, 2012). Another study of 172 countries found a strong link 
between economic discrimination against minority groups and an increased risk of terrorism 
(Piazza, 2011). 
f. Technological 
Finally, technology is increasingly seen as important factor contributing to 
radicalisation. Islamic State has been hugely successful in recruiting young fighters from 
around the globe by posting slick propaganda videos on YouTube, Twitter and Facebook 
(Greenberg, 2016; Klausen, 2015; McDowell-Smith, Speckhard, & Yayla, 2017). As 
Greenberg (2016: 166) explains, this strategy ‘speaks directly to the youth it is targeting for 
recruitment, using the medium that works best for these youth’.  
 Islamic State’s global reach would not have been possible without the Internet. 
However, the causal link between viewing extremist material on the Internet and 
radicalisation remains unclear. It is more common for individuals to view extremist material 
online while being radicalised through group networks and social relationships. It is less 
common for them to ‘self-radicalise’ purely through exposure to extremist material online, 
without any human connection (Stevens & Neumann, 2009). As Conway (2016: 77) explains, 
there is ‘no yet proven connection between consumption of and networking around violent 
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extremist online content and adoption of extremist ideology and/or engagement in violent 
extremism and terrorism’. 
 
g. Summary 
There is no single definition or model of radicalisation, and its causes are various and 
complex. However, there are sufficient common themes across the literature to draw some 
general observations. Radicalisation is a gradual though not necessarily linear process in 
which a person internalises and strengthens their association with an extremist ideology while 
moving towards violent action. Extremist ideas are those which justify the use of violence to 
achieve political or religious change. This process is influenced heavily by external groups 
and networks.  
The reasons why people embark on this process are complex. They are not reducible 
to a singular psychological or economic profile, though some factors have greater impact than 
others. These factors and an assessment of the current state of the literature are summarised in 
Table 1. Young people who lack self-esteem and a strong sense of identity can be more easily 
persuaded, manipulated or coerced by terrorist groups to adopt an extremist ideology. 
Political grievances (including anger about Western involvement in the Middle East) and 
economic disparity (where combined with discrimination against minority communities) 
provide important context. Technology increases the risks of radicalisation by allowing 
terrorist groups to communicate their propaganda globally and speak directly to a younger 
audience. 
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Table 1. Causes of Radicalisation 
Factors Influence on Radicalisation 
Ideological 
Core to understanding terrorist propaganda, but the impact of 
ideology on radicalisation remains difficult to establish because 
many radicals are not violent, many terrorists are not devoutly 
religious, and terrorist organisations have strategic aims. 
Psychological 
 
Cannot be reduced to a single profile or pathology but a lack of 
self-esteem and sense of identity are key to understanding why 
young people are drawn to terrorist organisations  
 
Social 
 
A key contributing factor which allows terrorist groups and 
networks to manipulate, persuade or coerce individuals into 
adopting an extremist ideology  
 
Political 
 
A sense of injustice over Western involvement in the Middle 
East provides important context and remains an important 
aspect of terrorist recruitment and propaganda  
 
Economic 
 
Terrorism is not linked to poverty or low socio-economic status, 
but economic disparity can influence radicalisation where 
combined with a personal experience of minority discrimination 
 
Technological 
The influence of technology on behavioural radicalisation 
remains unclear, but the Internet and social media allow terrorist 
organisations to have global reach and speak to a younger 
audience 
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IV.  Methods and Sources  
 
The analysis below compares this scholarly research on radicalisation with Western CVE 
policy. Part Five draws on case studies of CVE policy in the UK, Australia, Denmark, 
Sweden and The Netherlands. The main data sources for each case study are the CVE policy 
documents published by each national government (Home Office, 2011, 2015; Australian 
Government, 2015; Government of Denmark, 2016; Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014; Ministry of 
Security and Justice, 2014), and, where available, each government’s national counter-
terrorism strategy (Council of Australian Governments, 2015; Home Office, 2018; Löfven & 
Ygeman, 2014; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2016). The analysis 
focuses on current policy, though previous policies have been included where they explain 
key elements of the current policy, mark significant changes in that policy over time, or fill 
gaps in how radicalisation is currently explained (Government of Denmark, 2009, 2014; 
Home Office, 2009; Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007).  
 The case study countries have been selected on the basis that they exhibit core 
similarities and important differences. The countries have similar political, legal and 
democratic traditions and have recently published counter-terrorism policy in response to 
Islamic State in a broadly similar format. Sweden’s counter-terrorism strategy, for example, 
comprises three strands (‘Prevent’, ‘Preempt’ and ‘Protect’) (Löfven & Ygeman, 2014), 
which directly mirror those found in the UK’s CONTEST strategy (Home Office, 2018). The 
countries all face an ongoing serious threat of terrorism related to returning foreign fighters 
and related homegrown terrorism. 
At the same time, each country has a different experience with terrorism and counter-
terrorism, which allows for fruitful comparison. The UK’s long history of responding to 
terrorism in the colonies and Northern Ireland (Newsinger, 2015) contrasts with Sweden’s 
experience of responding to right-wing extremism (Bjørgo, 1993), and with the comparatively 
limited experience of the remaining countries. The UK has experienced a series of serious 
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recent attacks, while Sweden, Australia and Denmark have experienced some recent attacks 
on a smaller scale.  
These countries also have contrasting experiences with CVE. The UK’s experience 
with Prevent has been longstanding but highly problematic (Briggs, 2010; Lakhani, 2012). 
Denmark has been praised for its innovative approaches to offender reintegration (Young et 
al., 2016). The Netherlands’ approach has focused to a greater extent on integration and has 
developed over time from a community-based strategy to a national approach (Koehler, 2017: 
248). Australia has invested much less in CVE, devoting most of its resources to coercive 
legal responses to terrorism (Hardy & Williams, 2016). It has looked closely to the UK in 
designing its own counter-terrorism laws and policy (Roach, 2006), but a key difference is 
that Australia remains the only democratic nation without national human rights protection 
(Williams, 2007). This has allowed the Australian Parliament to enact some of the world’s 
most extraordinary legal responses to terrorism (Hardy & Williams, 2016).  
 Part Five presents the results of a qualitative study into these countries’ national CVE 
and counter-terrorism policies. The core aim of this study was to assess the extent to which 
these policy documents accurately reflect the current scholarly research on radicalisation. 
Three research questions shaped the analysis, and the policy documents were coded according 
to themes identified in the literature review above. First, how do these countries define 
radicalisation and extremism in their CVE policy? Second, how do these countries explain the 
causes of radicalisation, and which factor(s) do they consider to be the most important? 
Finally, do their policies explain radicalisation in ways that are consistent or at least broadly 
compatible?  
 Balancing diversity and consistency across CVE policy remains a difficult challenge. 
On the one hand, some variation in these policies should be expected and encouraged. There 
may well be cultural, political and historical reasons why these countries approach CVE and 
explain radicalisation in different ways (some of these are addressed below). Individuals will 
radicalise for reasons that are specific to their local context. The UK’s experience with 
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Prevent demonstrates that CVE programs should be designed with local needs in mind 
(Briggs, 2010; Lakhani, 2012). 
At the same time, it is reasonable to expect that these countries should explain 
radicalisation in ways that are broadly consistent and compatible. Each country faces a similar 
type of threat: of ‘foreign fighters’ who have travelled to Iraq and Syria, and related 
homegrown terrorism. These threats are based on the same al-Qaeda-inspired ideology, 
disseminated through the Islamic State’s sophisticated propaganda machine. Their foreign 
fighters have travelled to the same conflict zones to fight with the same terrorist organisation, 
and returned home to countries with similar democratic, legal and political systems. There is 
no significant practical reason why one country should explain radicalisation primarily 
through an ideological lens, for example, and another to define it as a social or psychological 
phenomenon. To the extent that the scholarly research identifies recurring themes in how and 
why people radicalise, CVE programs should model that process in at least broadly similar 
ways. There is also a need for Western governments to maintain consistent (or at least 
compatible) explanations of radicalisation so they can cooperate effectively when countering 
the global threat. 
 The analysis below represents an initial exploration of how well the current scholarly 
research is integrated into Western CVE policy, and an initial comparative study of how these 
countries explain radicalisation and extremism. There remains a need for deeper and more 
extensive comparisons of how radicalisation is understood across different national contexts. 
There is also a need for further academic debate on the extent to which CVE policy and 
programs should be consistently designed.   
 
V. Countering Violent Extremism Policy 
 
How, then, do these countries understand and model the radicalisation process in their 
national CVE policy? Are their approaches in line with the scholarly research? And do they 
offer consistent explanations of its causes? 
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Each country’s policy adequately captures the core nature of radicalisation – as a 
complex process in which a person gradually adopts an extremist ideology. These policy 
definitions of radicalisation are set out in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Definitions of radicalisation in national CVE policy. 
Country Policy Definition of Radicalisation 
United Kingdom 
 
‘Radicalisation refers to the process by which a 
person comes to support terrorism and forms of 
extremism leading to terrorism’ (Home Office, 2011: 
108). 
 
Australia 
 
‘Radicalisation is a complex process that can occur 
for people across a diverse range of ethnic, national, 
political and religious groups. The process involves a 
series of decisions which, in certain circumstances 
will end in an act of violent extremism’ (Australian 
Government, 2015: 4) 
 
Denmark 
 
‘Radicalisation refers to a short- or long-term process 
where persons subscribe to extremist views or 
legitimise their actions on the basis of extremist 
ideologies’ (Government of Denmark, 2016: 7). 
 
Sweden 
 
‘Those who commit ideologically motivated acts for 
political or religious reasons have gone through a 
process in which they have gradually come to adopt a 
violent ideology or accept violence as a legitimate 
method which the scope of a political or religious 
ideology. This process is called radicalisation’ 
(Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014).   
 
Netherlands 
 
‘Radicalisation is a process that involves an 
increasing willingness to accept and act – perhaps 
violently – on even the most extreme implications of 
an ideology. Radicalisation can also be seen as the 
process by which individuals move from lawful 
activism towards extremism and, subsequently, 
terrorism’ (National Coordinator for Security and 
Counterterrorism, 2014: 6). 
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The Netherlands’ current definition is significantly narrower than that found in its 
earlier action plan (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007). That earlier policy 
defined radicalisation as the ‘willingness to strive for far-reaching changes in society 
(possibly in an undemocratic manner), to support such changes or persuade others to accept 
them’ (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007: 5). This captured a far greater 
range of conduct, and could have plausibly included political protest, industrial action and 
other legitimate dissent. Defining radicalisation as an ‘attitude’ (Ministry of Security and 
Justice, 2014: 33) also failed to capture the complex, gradual nature of the process. It 
suggested instead that a simple change in perspective would be sufficient for a person to 
radicalise. 
 With the exception of the UK, these policies also adequately capture the core nature of 
extremism and relate it consistently to the possibility of violent action. Australia targets 
violent extremism, which is said to be present ‘where a person or group decides that fear, 
terror and violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and then 
acts on these beliefs’ (Australian Government, 2015: 10). Sweden describes the adoption of a 
violent ideology, meaning that a person ‘accepts violence and sometimes also that they 
commit ideologically motivated crimes’ (Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014: 16). Denmark targets 
‘extremism’ rather than violent extremism, but defines extremism by reference to legitimising 
violence (Government of Denmark, 2016: 7). The Netherlands now links extremism to 
‘breaking the law and executing (violent) illegal actions (Ministry of Security and Justice, 
2014: 31). These approaches are, in other words, focused on behavioural radicalisation – or at 
least the risk of a violent act as the end-point of the process. 
Beyond these core similarities, there are important differences. The UK is a significant 
outlier in defining the scope of its Prevent strategy in very broad terms. Since 2009, the UK 
government (Home Office, 2009) has defined extremism to include non-violent ideas. This 
means views and opinions which involve ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British 
values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance for different faiths and beliefs’ (Home Office, 2011: 107). In other words, the scope 
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of Prevent clearly extends to cognitive radicalisation. This targets a much broader range of 
speech and opinions than would ordinarily be of concern to police and security services. As a 
result, it has raised significant concerns over free speech and discrimination against Britain’s 
Muslim communities (Briggs, 2010; Dudenhoefer, 2018; Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010; 
Lakhani, 2012; Lowe, 2017). 
There are also important differences in the weight given to different causes of 
radicalisation. Each country recognises there are multiple contributing factors, but there is 
significant variation in which cause is viewed as the primary driver. The current Danish 
strategy offers little explanation of why people radicalise, but its earlier action plan focused 
on the psychological search for identity (Government of Denmark, 2009: 8). The Netherlands 
also identifies psychological factors as being important, but its policies have focused 
consistently on a lack of integration and the polarization of ethnic communities (Ministry of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007). Australia’s strategy focuses equally on three main 
elements, being ideology, social networks and prior criminal behavior (Australian 
Government, 2015: 8). Sweden focuses on propaganda and the Internet, as well as ideology 
and political grievances (Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014). Sweden is arguably alone in focusing on 
the role of grievances, including a sense of injustice generated by Islamophobia and military 
interventions (Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014: 15). These dominant policy explanations of why 
people radicalise are summarised in Table 3. 
The UK is an outlier in giving the greatest weight to ideological factors. The first 
objective of Prevent is to counter ideology, and the other causes of radicalisation relate back 
to this primary goal. Rather than being significant causes on their own terms, psychological 
and social factors are said to influence radicalisation by making extremist ideology more 
attractive:   
 
We judge that radicalisation is driven by an ideology which sanctions the use of 
violence; by propagandists for that ideology here and overseas; and by personal 
vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, for a range of reasons, make that 
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ideology seem both attractive and compelling (Home Office, 2011: 5). 
 
This focus on combating ideology could also be seen in Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
2011 Munich speech (UK Government, 2011). More recently, it has carried through into the 
2015 counter-extremism strategy. In a foreword to that strategy, Cameron spoke of defeating 
a ‘poisonous ideology’ and the ‘scourge of extremism’ (Home Office, 2015: 6-7). The 
strategy focused on Islamic State’s extremist narrative and the cultural threat this entails: 
 
ISIL is a particularly grotesque manifestation of an extreme Islamist narrative, which 
seeks to impose a new Islamic state governed by a harsh interpretation of Shari’a as 
state law and totally rejects liberal values such as democracy, the rule of law and 
equality (Home Office, 2015: 22). 
The strategy discusses the threat from alternative systems of Sharia law, the rejection of 
democracy, and controversial cultural practices like female genital mutilation (Home Office, 
2015). 
 This combative language focusing on the ideological and cultural threat of terrorism 
was toned down significantly in the most recent review of CONTEST (Home Office, 2018). 
That document recognises the threat from right-wing extremism to a greater extent, and it 
emphasizes the benefits of public-private partnerships and a multi-agency approach. The 
Prevent strand returns to the idea of building community ‘resilience’ to extremism (Home 
Office, 2018). However, the policy retains a focus on ideology as a ‘strong driver’ of 
radicalisation and recognises other factors to a lesser extent (Home Office, 2018: 16). The 
focus continues to be on the ideological threat from al-Qaeda and Islamic State. In addition, 
the earlier Prevent and Counter-Extremism strategies remain current and relevant (Home 
Office, 2011, 2015).  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Keiran Hardy: Comparing Theories of Radicalisation with Countering Violent Extremism 
Policy 
 
 
 
 
98 
Table 3. Dominant causes of radicalisation in CVE policy. 
Country Dominant Explanations of Radicalisation 
United Kingdom 
 
Ideological 
 
Australia 
 
Ideological 
Social 
Criminal (not supported) 
 
Denmark 
 
Psychological 
 
Sweden 
 
Ideological 
Technological 
Political 
 
Netherlands 
 
Psychological 
Cultural (not supported) 
 
 
None of these approaches is fundamentally inaccurate, and there are positive features – 
but they differ in important ways and none implement the available research across the board. 
The scholarly literature suggests that ideology and technology are not primary drivers of 
radicalisation. The literature suggests that social networks and psychology are the most 
influential, but these causes are under-represented in government policy. The Netherlands 
draws a link between terrorism and a lack of integration which is not empirically supported 
(Rahimi & Graumans, 2015). Australia draws a link to prior criminal behavior which is not 
reflected in the literature. Overall, there is significant scope for improvement as to how 
accurately and consistently these policies define the causes of radicalisation. 
The clash of cultures described in UK policy is particularly problematic. It is 
inconsistent with the scholarly literature, which suggests that psychological and social factors 
have a greater impact (Guhl, 2018; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). More importantly, the rhetoric is 
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dangerous because it reinforces the very idea – captured in the extremist worldview of 
terrorist organisations – that the West is at war with Islam. It is no surprise, given this focus 
on the ideological threat, that Prevent has suffered from criticism for its heavy focus on 
Islamist terrorism and disproportionate focus on Muslim communities (Briggs, 2010; Githens-
Mazer & Lambert, 2010; Kyriacou, Reed, Said, & Davies, 2017; Lakhani, 2012). 
 These results suggest two things, each requiring further investigation. First, the way 
that a government explains radicalisation in its national policy can affect the design of its 
CVE programs. A government which focuses on the ideological causes of radicalisation 
(Home Office, 2011, 2015) is likely to invest more resources in counter-narratives, de-
radicalisation programs, and efforts to support ‘moderate’ Muslim leaders. A government 
which focuses on the polarization of ethnic communities (Ministry of the Interior and 
Kingdom Relations, 2007) is likely to devote more resources to improving integration. A 
government which explains radicalisation by reference to criminal behavior and social bonds 
(Australian Government, 2015) is likely to devote resources to disrupting terrorist groups, and 
so on.  
Second, the UK’s experience suggests that the way a government explains 
radicalisation can impact on the success of its CVE programs. Explaining radicalisation 
primarily by reference to extremist ideology is likely to create damaging perceptions that the 
government is targeting Muslim communities. 
 There are many justifiable reasons why CVE policy differs across these countries. 
Some of the variation can be explained by the lack of any definite answers as to how and why 
radicalisation happens. Empirical research on radicalisation continues, but a true consensus is 
unlikely to ever be reached. Other differences can be explained historically and politically. 
Sweden’s national strategy, for example, focuses on right-wing extremism to a much greater 
extent than any of the other policies (Löfven & Kuhnke, 2014. Given Sweden’s significant 
experience with militant neo-Nazi groups (Bjørgo, 1993), this remains an appropriate strategy 
for that context. It is unreasonable to expect that the other countries could simply replicate 
Sweden’s approach without the same historical background.  
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Other differences might be explained by different threat levels, whether a country has 
experienced recent successful attacks, and contrasting approaches to integration. The UK’s 
more combative response to extremist ideology, for example, might be explained by the series 
of recent attacks in London and a ‘backlash’ against multiculturalism (Abass, 2007; Bertossi, 
2011). In his Munich speech, David Cameron suggested that young men were turning to 
terrorism because multiculturalism policy had led to a ‘weakening of our collective identity’ 
and an acceptance of segregation (UK Government, 2011). This suggests that CVE policy can 
be shaped less by evidence-based research, and more so by local politics, history and culture.  
At the same time, for the reasons explained in Part Four, it is reasonable to expect that 
governments will draw on evidence-based research to the greatest extent available, and that 
their explanations of radicalisation remain broadly consistent. There are no definite answers to 
how or why people radicalise, but there are sufficient common themes to guide a consistent, 
evidence-based approach. As it stands, more work is required to achieve this level of accuracy 
and consistency. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Radicalisation is a complex process with no easy explanations. In a basic sense, a person 
radicalises where they adopt an extremist ideology and gradually move towards violent 
action. Beyond this, there are no definite answers as to how and why people radicalise, 
because the particular process and influences involved differ in each individual case. This 
makes it difficult for governments to design national policy strategies for countering 
extremism and radicalisation. 
 This article has analysed models and theories of radicalisation and assessed whether 
this scholarly research is accurately reflected in Western CVE policy. Case studies of the UK, 
Australia, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands suggest that national CVE policies 
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adequately capture the core nature of radicalisation, but otherwise exhibit significant variation 
in how they explain its causes.  
While these countries accurately recognise multiple causes of radicalisation, they 
choose to focus on one or more factors which they see as the primary driver. The primary 
drivers of radicalisation are variously considered to be social, ideological, psychological, or 
technological. More work is needed to ensure the accuracy and consistency of these causal 
explanations against scholarly standards.  
 The UK is a notable outlier. Its Prevent strategy targets non-violent ideas and focuses 
to the greatest extent on extremist ideology. This approach is not only inconsistent with the 
scholarly literature, which suggests that psychological and social factors have a greater impact 
(Guhl, 2018; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). It has also contributed to criticisms that Prevent work 
impacts on free speech and further alienates Britain’s Muslim communities (Kyriacou et al., 
2017). 
How a government explains radicalisation in its national policy strategies is not 
merely semantic, and can have a significant impact on the design and success of its CVE 
programs. A focus on ideological factors is likely to see greater investments in counter-
narratives, a focus on psychological factors is likely to see more counselling for young 
people, and so on. There is a need to ensure that these explanations and the strategies used to 
counter radicalisation are based in the available evidence. A heavy focus on ideology as the 
primary driver of radicalisation is not only inaccurate; it is also likely to undermine the 
success of CVE programs by aggravating perceptions that governments are targeting Muslim 
communities with counter-terrorism powers.   
 Empirical evaluations of CVE programs are limited but growing in number (Feddes & 
Gallucci, 2015; Mastroe, 2016; Zeiger & Aly, 2015). The current study suggests that deeper 
comparative research is needed into CVE policy and how this impacts on the shape and 
success of CVE programs on the ground. Comparing CVE policy and programs across 
national borders remains an important task. 
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